Signed & unmodified
A $50,000 services contract delivered exactly as it was signed — the signature matches, the signer resolves over DNS and a trust registry, and the content has not been touched since.
See the valid page →Anyone can copy, screenshot, or impersonate a web page. A cryptographic signature on a public identity is how a reader can tell an authentic document from one that's been altered. This page — and every page on this site — carries one. Click the button and verify it yourself.
Below are three versions of the same services contract. They look nearly identical — but one has had its dollar value quietly altered. The verify button tells you which one you can actually rely on.
A $50,000 services contract delivered exactly as it was signed — the signature matches, the signer resolves over DNS and a trust registry, and the content has not been touched since.
See the valid page →The same contract, but the value was inflated from $50,000 to $50,000,000 after signing. The signature still exists — and verification catches the discrepancy instantly.
See the tampered page →Most pages on the web offer no proof of authorship or integrity. There is nothing cryptographic to check; you simply have to trust the URL bar. That's the status quo.
The rest of the internet
Every signature on this site anchors to a public decentralized
identifier (did:web:jacqueslatour.ca) — which itself
resolves over DNSSEC. No ledger, no blockchain, no account with a
third-party platform. Just math, DNS, and a sidecar file.
A SHA-256 hash of the page content is signed with an Ed25519
private key (and an ML-DSA-44 post-quantum key). The result
lands in a .vrfy sidecar next to the page.
The public half of the key is hosted at a public DID document
at /.well-known/did.json, anchored to the site's
DNS and TLS certificate.
A verifier fetches the page and its sidecar, resolves the DID, checks the signature, and confirms the DNS anchor. The result is a cryptographic yes-or-no — not an assertion of trust.